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ABSTRACT: In current research on discourse analysis and on metonymy there is an idea that
is missing: the study of the discourse potential of metonymic activity. The reasons for this
are to be found, in all likelihood, on the one hand, the still dominant idea that text coherence
(also called text cohesion at the lexical level) does take place propositionally and on the other
hand, on the also prevalent idea (tightly complementary to the first one) that metonymy is
simply a local cognitive phenomenon, of a mainly referential nature. However, the evidence
suggests, as will be extensively demonstrated in this paper, that metonymy is pervasive in
much of our cognitive and discourse activities. Thus, metonymy may underlie the generation
of conversational implicatures and the interpretation of indirect speech acts. It is through the
cognitive approach and the application of frame semantics that we are in the position to offer
a more plausible explanation of the discourse coherence  phenomenon. After introducing the
various approaches to semantics and justifying the convenience of a maximalist approach, I
discuss the role of metaphor and above all the role of metonymy in discourse, as a pervading
source of inferencing and coherence.
Keywords: metonymy, metaphor, discourse coherence, implicature, ICM.
RESUMEN: En la investigación actual sobre discurso y metonimia todavía no existe una
investigación importante sobre el potencial discursivo de la metonimia. Las principales
razones hay que buscarlas en la perspectiva proposicional predominante en que se explica el
fenómeno de la coherencia y por otro lado el papel de la metonimia, que se encuentra
relegado a un fenómeno cognitivo simplemente local. Estas dos perspectivas se
complementan y refuerzan para pesentarnos un panorama incompleto. Sin embargo la
evidencia nos demuestra que la metonimia tiene un papel predominante en la generación de
implicaturas conversacionales y en la interpretación de actos de habla indirectos. La
lingüística cognitiva, la semántica de marcos, nos ofrecen los instrumentos para una
explicación más plausible de la relación entre discurso y metonimia. Una vez justificada la
conveniencia de elegir un enfoque maximalista en semántica, se discuten el papel de la
metáfora y más en profundidad el papel de la metonimia en el discurso, como fenómenos que
impregnan las actividades de inferencia y coherencia discursivas. 
Palabras clave: metonimia, metáfora, coherencia discursiva, implicatura, ICM.
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1. Introduction: Semantics and Discourse
There are many ways of doing semantics. We have formal semantics, which makes
use of principles of logic in looking at concepts in terms of classes of items subject to
logical operations and definable in terms of intensional and extensional meaning. We
have interpretive semantics, in which lexical items can be arranged according to their
capability to combine with one another on the basis of selection restrictions (e.g. such
atomic concepts as +/- human, +/-living, etc.). There are also paradigmatic approaches
like Coseriu’s lexematics whereby lexical items are arranged onomasiologically
according to their inherent semasiological structure. Other approaches, like Wierzbicka’s
analysis and the cognitive semantics approach come closer to providing rich semantic
characterizations for each lexical item or for the conceptual constructs associated with
them. Wierzbicka believes that the essentials of world knowledge can be captured in
definitions by means of a set of universal, atomic concepts that she calls “semantic
primitives” (e.g. small, big, kind, good, do, etc.). Cognitive semantics has taken two
forms: idealized cognitive models theory (Lakoff, 1987), and frame semantics (Fillmore;
Atkins, 1992, 1994). In cognitive semantics concepts are complex structures consisting
of a number of elements and their associated roles (e.g. in a buying frame, we have a
buyer, a seller, a market, merchandise, and money). 
It is possible to divide all these different ways of dealing with semantics into two
basic approaches: one, we will call the minimalist view, and the other the maximalist
view. Only cognitive semantics fits the latter category, since it tries to capture all the
complexities of conceptual organization. I will argue that, precisely because of these
ambitious goals, only a maximalist approach can be productively used to account for
discourse activity.
2. The Maximalist Approach
Let us consider Lakoff’s account of the notion of mother (Lakoff, 1987). By way of
contrast, we will start by providing Wierzbicka’s definition of the same concept as
created on the basis of her set of primitive universals (Wierzbicka, 1996: 154-155):
X is Y’s mother. =
(a) at one time, before now, X was very small
(b) at that time, Y was inside X
(c) at that time, Y was like a part of X
(d) because of this, people can think something like this about X:
“X wants to do good things for Y
X doesn’t want bad things to happen to Y”.
Wierzbicka’s definition, although apparently strange, has the value of being
couched in terms of (primitive) universal notions like ‘at one time’, ‘before’, ‘now’, ‘part
of’, ‘small’, ‘inside’, ‘good’, and others. It provides us with a way to identify the notion
of the relation mother-child without making direct use of non-universal concepts like
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‘birth’ or ‘taking care of’. However, the definition, as it stands, misses a lot of the
richness of what we know about mothers, as evidenced by a number of extensions of the
concept: ‘surrogate mother’ (i.e. a woman that gives birth to a baby on behalf of another
woman), ‘biological mother’, ‘foster mother’, ‘adoptive mother’, ‘stepmother’, etc.
While biological mothers and surrogate mothers carried their babies inside their wombs,
foster mothers and adoptive mothers only take care of them. Still, in a sense the different
kinds of mother are mothers, although they do not comply with all the aspects of the
definition. A surrogate mother bears a baby, but there is no reason why she should want
good things to happen to the baby just because at one time the baby was inside her.
However, a foster mother, who has not had the baby inside her, is expected to love and
care for her child. 
A maximalist approach also takes into account metaphorical and metonymic uses
of concepts. For Lakoff (1987, 1993) a metaphor is a set of correspondences (what he
calls a conceptual mapping) between two discrete conceptual domains: one of them,
called the source, allows us to understand and reason about the other called the target.
Thus, in ARGUMENT IS WAR we see people arguing as contenders in a battle who plan
tactics, attack, defend, counterattack, gain or lose ground, and finally win or lose (e.g.
She had been gaining ground throughout the debate, but then she faltered and her
opponent was able to beat her). A metonymy is considered a domain-internal conceptual
mapping, as in She loves Plato, where “Plato” stands for Plato’s work.
Now consider these sentences:
(1)
(a) My wife mothers me.
(b) She mothers her children well.
(c) Necessity is the mother of invention.
(d) Spanish is my mother tongue.
(e) My mother is not married to my father.
(f) She’s my grandmother on my mother’s side.
Sentences (1.a) and (1.b) are based upon the idea that mothers take care of their
children. The difference is that (1.a) is a metaphorical use of the notion whereas (1.b) is
a literal use. In fact, in (1.b) it is taken for granted that the protagonist is the biological
mother of the children that she takes care of (on some interpretations, there is the
possibility that she is not the biological mother). In (1.c) the idea that mothers give birth
to children is used metaphorically to help us reason about the relationship between
necessity and invention (necessity is at the origin of invention). In (1.d), the mother
tongue is the language that you learn from your mother as a native speaker: again there
is a metaphor that exploits the birth connection between mother and child. In sentence
(1.e) the speaker seems to take for granted that most people think that children are
usually born within the bonds of marriage and it is in this context that his remark makes
sense. Finally, (1.f) calls upon the idea that one’s mother is the closest female ancestor. 
The full meaning impact of all these sentences can only be accounted for on the
basis of a richer description of motherhood than the one provided by a minimalist
analysis. A maximalist analysis, like the one provided by Lakoff (1987), postulates at
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least five cognitive structures that seem to cluster in our minds to account for all aspects
of our understanding of the notion of mother: the birth model (cf. biological mother,
mother tongue, Necessity is the mother of invention), the nurturance model (cf. adoptive
mother, foster mother, She mothers me), the marital model (cf. My mother is not married
to my father), the biological model (cf. surrogate mother), and the genealogical model
(cf. She’s my grandmother on my mother’s side). What is more, there are important
pragmatics and discourse consequences of this form of maximalist analysis. Take the
following extensions of the previous examples:
(1’)
(a) My wife mothers me; in fact, she spoils me and I just love that!
(b) She mothers her children well; while she prepares their meals, she bathes
and puts them to bed.
(c) Necessity is the mother of invention, and, as everybody knows, a skinny
woman named Poverty is the mother of Necessity.
(d) Spanish is my mother tongue but for me English is like a mother tongue too.
(e) My mother is not married to my father, but I don’t care much.
(f) She’s my grandmother on my mother’s side, but in my mind she’s closer to
me than my own mother.
Mothers in taking care of their children often give them everything they ask for.
This is generally regarded as negative since children also need discipline (note that
mothering well is incompatible with spoiling a child); but this negative association does
not carry over to the metaphorical extension (1’.a), since in the context of adults the
discipline element is not present. Example (1’.b) makes some relevant connections with
the standard notion of mothering a child well. However, note the impossibility of:
(1’’.b) She mothers her children well; in fact she spoils them!
Explaining why (1’.b) is possible while (1’’.b) is not requires a maximalist account
in which genuine motherhood is connected not only to nurturance but also to the
discipline of children. This apparently trivial aspect of the semantic organization of
linguistic expressions, i.e. that metaphorical extensions of concepts only make use of
partial conceptual structure for the metaphoric source, has important discourse
consequences in terms of an account of the discourse potential of expressions. 
3. The Role of Metonymy in Discourse Meaning and Structure
The study of metonymy is also part of the maximalist approach to meaning to the
extent that it is possible to argue that metonymic connections are part of our
conventionalized knowledge of the world. Think of the metonymic association between
hands and labourers (We need two more hands here), instruments and players (The piano
has the flue), customers and orders (The ham sandwich is waiting for his bill), authors
and their works (I like Shakespeare), a controlling entity for the entity that is controlled
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(e.g. The buses are on strike), and actors and their roles (Hamlet was superb last night),
among many others. 
One of the main concerns of cognitive linguists working on metonymy has been to
provide clear definitional and typological criteria which separate metonymy from
metaphor and from literal uses of language (cf. Barcelona, 2000; Ruiz de Mendoza,
2000). More recently, some work has been devoted to the connection between
metonymy and pragmatic inferencing (cf. the collection of papers in Panther; Thornburg,
2003). Some of the crucial findings in these studies are the following:
1 Metonymy is a pervasive phenomenon in language that goes beyond cases of
referential shifts commonly attested the literature (e.g. ORDER FOR
CUSTOMER, INSTRUMENT FOR PLAYER, CONTROLLER FOR
CONTROLLED, etc.). Thus, it is proposed that there are several kinds of non-
referential metonymy: (i) predicative metonymies like Mary is just a pretty face
(meaning ‘Mary has a beautiful face’ and implying that her beauty is her only
relevant attribute to the exclusion of others like intelligence; cf. Ruiz de
Mendoza, 2000); (ii) propositional metonymies like She waved down a taxi
(meaning that she stopped a taxi by waving at it) (cf. Lakoff, 1987); (iii)
illocutionary metonymies (e.g. I can buy you a bicycle, where the speaker’s
ability to buy an item stands for his guarantee that he will buy the item; cf. similar
proposals in Thornburg; Panther, 1997; Panther; Thornburg, 1998); (iv) and
situational metonymies (e.g. The poor dog left with its tail between its legs, where
part of a conventional scenario stands for the full scenario in which the dog is
beaten and probably humiliated in such a way that the animal has to leave to
avoid further harm; cf. Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002). 
2 Kövecses; Radden (1998) introduce for the first time the notion of high-level
metonymy, where both source and target are generic cognitive models (e.g.
INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION as in He hammered a nail into the wall). Ruiz de
Mendoza; Pérez (2001) and Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002) have studied the full
semantic import of many grammatical phenomena on the basis of possible
underlying high-level metonymies. Thus, it is possible to explain some
asymmetries in the use of resultative predicates on the grounds of the semantic
constraints imposed by high-level metonymic mappings. Consider the application
of the high-level metonymy RESULT FOR ACTION (first identified by Panther;
Thornburg, 2000) to account for the infelicity of *Fall asleep versus Don’t fall
asleep. The difference in meaning between the two sentences (and their degree of
felicity) is evident from the following respective paraphrases based upon the
proposed metonymy: ‘act in such a way that as a result you will fall asleep’
(which is hardly feasible), and ‘act in such a way that as a result you won’t fall
asleep’. It is also possible to find a metonymic motivation for such phenomena as
the subcategorial conversion of nouns (e.g. There were three Johns at the party,
ENTITY FOR COLLECTION), the recategorization of adjectives (e.g. blacks,
nobles, PROPERTY FOR ENTITY), and modality shifts (POTENTIALITY FOR
ACTUALITY, as in I can see the mountain from my window, where “I can see”
means ‘I actually see because the conditions allow me to see’).
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3 Metonymy interacts with metaphor in significant ways. Goossens (1990) was the
first cognitive linguist to address this issue in his article “Metaphtonymy”.
However, he used limited evidence coming from a small body-part corpus and his
findings have only partial value. Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez (2002) have provided
the most detailed and systematic account of interaction patterns in which
metonymy plays a role. Their proposal is based upon the formal distinction
between two basic metonymy types and the conceptual operations which hinge
upon them. In Nixon bombed Hanoi, “Nixon” stands for the United States air
force under his command, a subdomain of ‘Nixon’ ; this is a case where the
metonymic target is a subdomain of the source, or a target-in-source metonymy.
In The ham sandwich is waiting for his bill, the order is a subdomain of the
customer who has placed the order; this is a source-in-target metonymy. In the
first case, we have a cognitive operation of reduction of the amount of conceptual
material that is needed to find the right referent for the expression (since the
actual referent is a subdomain of the source, the target is conceptually smaller for
the purposes of the Metonymic operation). In the second case we have an
operation of conceptual expansion (the source gives us access to a conceptually
richer target). Within the framework of a metaphoric mapping, Ruiz de Mendoza;
Díez (2002) postulate that metonymy plays a subsidiary role. It may either
expand or reduce the metaphoric source or the metaphoric target. These examples
will illustrate the four patterns (there are of course a number of subpatterns, since
the reduction operation may work on the whole source and target or on just part
of it):
- Metonymic expansion of the metaphoric source: He beat his breast, uttered in
a situation in which the protagonist has not actually beaten his breast. The
source has the underspecified situation in which a person beats his breast as
an open show of sorrow about something wrong that he has done.
- Metonymic reduction of the metaphoric source: She’s my soul, where “soul”
stands for a subdomain of ‘soul’, i.e. ‘the essence of my existence’, in the
metaphoric source. The target has the person that we are talking about.
- Metonymic expansion of the metaphoric target: She caught my ear, where
‘ear’ in the metaphoric target is the instrument of hearing that stands for
‘attention’; catching an object is a way of getting hold of it and maps onto the
idea of obtaining someone’s attention.
- Metonymic reduction of the metaphoric target: She won my heart, where
‘heart’ stands for a cultural subdomain of heart, i.e. ‘love’. The source has a
person that wins a prize while the target has a lover that obtains someone’s
love.
What is missing in current research on metonymy is the study of the discourse
potential of metonymic activity. The reason for this is to be found, in all likelihood, in
the still dominant idea that metonymy is simply a local cognitive phenomenon, of a
mainly referential nature. However, the evidence suggests, as pointed out above, that
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metonymy is pervasive in much of our cognitive activity. Thus, it may underlie the
generation of conversational implicatures and the interpretation of indirect speech acts:
(2)
(a) How did you go to the airport? -I stopped a taxi.
(b) It’s getting colder here [addressee closes an open window]
In (2.a) the answer “I stopped a taxi” does not fully address the first speaker’s
question. But we know that it is part of a conventional scenario (or idealized cognitive
model) pertaining to the use of taxi services: within that scenario, stopping a taxi is a
precondition to take the taxi and ask the driver to take you to your destination. From the
point of view of metonymy, the act of stopping a taxi provides us with a point of access
to the whole scenario, in such a way that the person asking the question may reason:
[1] ‘If he stopped a taxi, this means he took a taxi and he gave the driver
instructions to take him to the airport; so, he took a taxi to go there’
In (2.b) we also have a conventional scenario that differs in quality from the one
specified for (2.a). In effect, what we have in (2.b) is an action scenario based upon what
Leech (1983) called the pragmatic cost-benefit scale, i.e. the idea that, because of
accepted social norms, we are required to minimize cost and maximize benefit for others
while maximizing cost and minimizing cost to selves. In the context of that action
scenario, the addressee of an utterance like (2.b), which seems to point to the speaker’s
discomfort, is expected to do all he can to change the situation to the speaker’s benefit.
What speech act theorists call the “illocutionary force” of this utterance is ultimately
calculated on the basis of a metonymic operation whereby part of an action scenario
stands for the whole of it. The reasoning process may take the following form:
[2] ‘If the speaker makes a remark about a costly state of affairs that affects him
negatively, this means that he wants to draw my attention to such a state of
affairs so that I have the opportunity to act in such a way that cost to the speaker
is minimized even if I have to maximize cost to myself; since I think it is an
open window that makes him feel cold, the speaker expects me to close the
window for him’.
Gricean pragmaticists, (cf. Bach; Harnish, 1979; Grice, 1989) would address the
problem of the inferential process used by the first speaker in (5.a) by postulating a
pragmatic principle or maxim that regulates the process and produces an implicature. In
this case, the maxim of relation (‘be relevant’) would apply and direct the addressee to
look for a relevant answer connected to the information explicitly given. 
Neo-Gricean pragmaticists, like Levinson (2000) would deal with this implicature-
derivation process on the basis of some sort of conventional heuristics that is part of our
reasoning equipment. More specifically, Levinson (2000: 31-35) proposes three
heuristics (i.e. reasoning systems) that lie at the basis of implicated meaning:
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(i) First heuristic: “What isn’t said, isn’t”; e.g. in There is a blue pyramid on the
red cube, this heuristic licenses inferences like these: ‘There is not a cone on
the red cube’; ‘There is not a red pyramid on the red cube’.
(ii) Second heuristic: “What is simply described is stereotypically exemplified”;
e.g. in The blue pyramid is on the red cube, this heuristic licenses inferences
like the following: ‘The pyramid is a stereotypical one, on a square, rather than,
e.g., a hexagonal base’; ‘The pyramid is directly supported by the cube (e.g.
there is no intervening slab)’; ‘The pyramid is centrally placed on, or properly
supported by, the cube (it is not teetering on the edge, etc.)’; ‘The pyramid is in
canonical position, resting on its base, and not balanced, e.g. on its apex’. 
(iii) Third heuristic: “What is said in an abnormal way, isn’t normal; or marked
message indicates marked situation”; e.g. in The blue cuboid block is supported
by the red cube, this heuristic licenses the inferences: ‘The blue block is not,
strictly, a cube’; ‘The blue block is not directly or centrally or stably supported
by the red cube’.
Examples like (2.a) and (2.b) above would seem to be explainable by the third
heuristic, since they are marked messages that call for a special interpretation procedure.
Relevance theorists, following Sperber; Wilson (1995), would account for (2.a) and
(2.b) in a different way. For them, the answer “I stopped a taxi” is meaningful in context
provided that the second speaker has the intention of putting particular emphasis on the
fact that he had to take a taxi. There may be a number of reasons. Imagine a context in
which the speaker would have preferred to be given a lift by a friend and felt frustrated
that he had been turned down. The sentence “I stopped a taxi” is more meaningful (i.e.
it creates a broader range of what Sperber; Wilson call “contextual effects” in the
addressee’s mind) in this context than simply stating the less marked form “I went by
taxi”. In Relevance Theory it is taken for granted that when we communicate we try to
strike a balance between processing economy and contextual effects (i.e. modifications
of the addressee’s cognitive environment by adding, taking away or changing the
information that is manifest to him). An utterance like “I stopped a taxi” requires greater
inferential activity than the more straightforward “I went by taxi”; the greater effort
involved has to be compensated by extra contextual effects.
Even this brief account of the Gricean and post-Gricean standard explanations of
inference reveals one fundamental problem: the three accounts are capable of accounting
for the outcome of inferential activity, but have nothing to say about the nature of such
an activity. Thus, in all cases we know (because a conversational maxim is violated, or
because there is a conventional heuristic, or because the speaker tries to achieve
relevance) that we have to engage in special interpretative procedures when faced with
examples such as (2.a) and (2.b), but we are not told what those procedures are like. I
suggest that metonymic mappings, like those postulated by cognitive linguists, are a
clear case of such procedures. 
This proposal is consonant with another previous proposal made by Ruiz de
Mendoza; Pérez (2001) in the sense that metaphor and metonymy are to be listed among
the cognitive mechanisms used by speakers to produce explicatures. In standard
Relevance Theory, it is postulated that explicatures are derived on the basis of the
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development of the initial assumption schema provided by the utterance. Thus, in We are
ready, finding a referent for “we” (e.g. ‘my brother and I’) and completing the utterance
to specify what it is that the protagonists are ready for (e.g. ‘for the show’), is part of the
explicature-derivation activity. Implicatures, on the other hand, require more complex
reasoning schemas with implicit premises and implicated conclusions, as in the
following exchange uttered in the context of a party:
(3) What time is it? -Most of the guests are leaving now.
The answer to the first speaker’s question is relevant only if we bring into the
reasoning schema the implicit assumption that guests will leave when they feel that it is
getting too late for them or they have had enough. The conclusion is that it is time to
finish the event. 
Ruiz de Mendoza; Pérez (2001) have argued that metaphoric and metonymic
mappings produce explicatures based on the blueprint provided by the linguistic
expression. Thus, the shift from ‘shoe’ to ‘shoelaces’ in He didn’t tie his shoes well,
would be a development of the initial assumption schema provided by the expression
and would not need to import implicit premises from the context to fill in a reasoning
schema. 
However, in my proposal, even implicature-derivation is a matter of metonymy.
The difference is that the metonymy is not of the referential kind, but simply a situational
metonymy. In the case of reasoning schema [1], it is a low-level situational metonymy,
based on a specific scenario with specific conventional information about taking taxis.
However, in the case of [2] we have a high-level situational metonymy based on a
generic action scenario, i.e. the result of abstracting away common structure from many
situations in which speakers are directed (requested, order, suggested, etc.) to do things. 
Understanding metonymy is also crucial in order to explain some phenomena of
discourse cohesion. It may be useful to consider the GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC and the
EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymies, which have been identified by Panther; Thornburg
(2000) as a high-level metonymies with an impact on English grammar. Compare:
(4)
(a) 
A: What’s that bird?
B: It’s a robin.
(b)
A: What’s that noise?
B: It’s a burglar.
As Panther; Thornburg (2000) point out, the What’s that N? construction, when
used metonymically, has two senses, the taxonomic, as in example (4.a), and the causal,
as in (4.b). The taxonomic sense is regulated by the metonymic GENERIC IS
SPECIFIC: this allows us to paraphrase A’s utterance in (4.a) as ‘What kind of bird is
that?’. The causal sense has a metonymic grounding in the EFFECT FOR CAUSE
mapping, which yields a different kind of paraphrase for A’s utterance in (4.b): ‘What’s
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the cause of that noise?’. Panther; Thornburg note that while the English grammar makes
it possible to repeat the Noun Phrase instead of making use of the anaphoric pronoun in
(4.a), this is not the case for (4.b), and correlate this difference in grammatical behaviour
with the difference in the underlying metonymic mappings:
(5)
(a) That bird is a robin.
(b) *That noise is a burglar.
To Panther and Thornburg’s account, it is possible to add one more observation in
terms of discourse connectivity. Cohesion has often been treated as a grammatical
phenomenon, in contrast to coherence that was based on world knowledge (e.g. frames)
and was therefore purely conceptual. However, the fact that anaphora, one of the
procedures to create cohesion (Halliday; Hasan, 1976, 1989), may depend on metonymic
activation, seems to point to a different treatment of the issue, one in which cohesion is
seen as being conceptually grounded. This may apply to all other cases of anaphora:
(6) I love my family. They do all they can for me.
It is very well known that singular words which refer to groups of people (e.g.
police, family, government, team) can often be used as if they were plural. They can also
be used in the singular form, depending on how we want to think of them. Note that
using the singular anaphoric pronoun in (6’) would not be as appropriate:
(6’) I love my family. ?It does all it can for me.
However, the singular form is better on other occasions:
(7) My family is great (cf. ? My family are great)
There is a relationship between the foregoing discussion and one crucial finding in
the context of what has been called metonymic anaphora (e.g. Stirling, 1996), i.e.
anaphoric reference to a metonymic noun phrase. The finding was first made by Ruiz de
Mendoza (2000) and has been considerably refined in Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002). It
is the fact that anaphoric reference to a metonymic noun phrase always makes use of the
matrix (or most encompassing) domain of the metonymic mapping. Ruiz de Mendoza;
Otal (2002) have coined the label Domain Availability Principle (or DAP) to capture this
idea: only the matrix domain of a metonymic mapping is available for anaphoric
reference.
The issue of anaphora in connection to metonymy was first raised by Fauconnier
(1985) and Nunberg (1995) who give partial answers to the problem. Thus, Fauconnier
believes that there is a pragmatic function that connects a metonymic source and its
corresponding target, and that anaphora usually selects the metonymic target (i.e. the
intended mental representation), especially if the target is animate (e.g. in The ham
CLR-Nº 5-CORREC  28/5/08  11:52  Página 52
JOSÉ LUIS OTAL CAMPO Discourse, Semantics and Metonymy 53
sandwich is waiting for his bill, the target is animate and would be selected as the
antecedent for an anaphoric pronoun, as in The ham sandwich is waiting for his bill and
he is getting restless). If the source is animate, then it serves as the antecedent (e.g.
‘Napoleon’, rather than ‘Napoleon’s navy’, is the antecedent in After Napoleon lost at
Waterloo, he was banished to St. Helena). However, this analysis is incapable of
determining the potential antecedent when both source and target are either animate of
inanimate:
(8) Terminator (i.e. Arnold Schwarzenegger) has just been elected governor of
California. Will he be up to the job? 
(9) I love the book (i.e. its contents). I’ll read it a second time.
Nunberg (1995) tries to come to terms with the issue of metonymic anaphora by
making a distinction between two different types of linguistic mechanism: “deferred
indexical reference” and “predicate transfer”. The former is the process by means of
which an indexical is used to refer to an object that corresponds somehow to the
contextual element chosen by a demonstrative. The latter occurs whenever the name of
a property that applies to something in one domain is used to refer to the name of a
property that applies to things in another domain (Nunberg, 1995: 111). He gives the
following examples:
(10)
(a) This is parked out back.
(b) I am parked out back.
The two sentences are produced while the speaker is holding out a key. Sentence
(10.a) is a case of deferred indexical reference, where the demonstrative pronoun “this”
is used to refer to a car. Sentence (10.b) illustrates predicate transfer since a property of
cars (i.e. cars may be parked) is attributed to a person. According to Nunberg, the
distinction between deferred indexical reference and predicate transfers is enough to
explain cases of metonymic anaphora:
(11)
(a) This is parked out back and may not start.
(b) ??This only fits the left front door and is parked out back.
(c) I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes.
(d) * I am parked out back and may not start.
In deferred indexical reference, a conjoined predicate must be semantically
connected to the deferred referent, like ‘the car’ in (11.a), whereas in predicate transfer
the conjoined predicate must express a property of the element that receives the property,
i.e. the driver/owner in (11.c). However, this account cannot be applied to all cases of
metonymic anaphora. The main problems lie with the notion of predicate transfer:
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(12)
(a) Shakespeare (i.e. a book by Shakespeare) is right there on the top shelf.
Could you please hand it over to me?
(b) The kettle (i.e. the contents; the water in the kettle) is boiling; please, turn
it off. 
In (12.a) we have a case of what Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002) have called
double metonymy, AUTHOR FOR WORKS FOR MEDIUM, where AUTHOR and
MEDIUM are matrix domains, so “it” in (12.b) refers back to the medium of
presentation of Shakespeare’s works (e.g. a book). It must be borne in mind that
semantic compatibility between the metonymy and the predicate of the expression is
what makes us select the second and not the first matrix domain for the anaphoric
operation (cf. Shakespeare is on the top shelf; I would read him/it if I were you, where
“him” has the matrix ‘Shakespeare’ as its antecedent, and “it” the book, but in the two
cases we mean ‘Shakespeare’s work’). If we wanted to apply Nunberg’s analysis to
(12.a) we would have to postulate a predicate transfer whereby a property of books (i.e.
being stored on shelves) is applied to Shakespeare. The adjoined predicate ‘hand over’
would have to express a property of Shakespeare, since it is ‘Shakespeare’ that has
received the new property. But evidently this is not the case. The adjoined predicate
expresses a property of books (books can be handed over). 
In (12.b) the predicate transfer would give the property of ‘boiling’ to the kettle; the
adjoined predicate ‘turn off’ would have to express a property of kettles. However, it is
not kettles but the fire that we use to heat the water that is turned on or off. 
The Domain Availability Principle captures all cases of metonymic anaphora. In the
case of Nunberg’s example This is parked out back and may not start, “this” points to an
object (the key) that is to be considered a subdomain of the car to which it belongs, the
car being the matrix domain. In this interpretation, (it) may not start makes use of the
matrix domain for the anaphoric operation. Note that because we have deferred
reference, it would be impossible to say *This key is parked out back. 
The case of I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes is different.
The car is a subdomain of the owner of the car, so we have a metonymy from owner to
possession, where the matrix domain ‘owner’ is referred to anaphorically in the
conjoined sentence.
Example (12.a) is a clear case of the DAP: one of the two the matrix domains, i.e.
the one that combines with the predicate ‘be on the top shelf’ (the medium of
presentation of Shakespeare’s work) is used for the anaphoric operation. 
Finally, (12.b) is a more complex case. In principle, it is the matrix domain ‘kettle’
that is referred to by “it” in “turn it off”. However, when we say “turn the kettle off” what
we mean is turn the heating source off (e.g .the fire). However, the concept ‘kettle’ still
retains its status as the matrix domain in the case of the conceptual association between
‘kettle’ and ‘fire’, so the use of “it” is appropriate and abides by the DAP. 
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4. Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to outline what may be a productive and ‘bridge building’
approach to research in discourse studies. The combination of the most relevant
pragmatic principles, from which discourse studies should never divert, with the insights
of cognitive semantics, mostly the application of the immense potential of metonymic
grounding, as shown in the last section of this paper, can result in a very fruitful set of
discoveries that affect discourse in its central issues.
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